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HEALTHY ZONING
Matthew J. Parlow*
ABSTRACT
This Article explores local governments’ foray into the area of health
regulation through their general regulatory and land use powers. Local
governments are limited in their powers: they enjoy only those powers that
the state permits them and, in some cases, only those that they choose to
embrace themselves. Health care and health law have traditionally been the
domain of federal and state governments. However, many local governments
have begun to use what powers they have to attempt to address obesity and
other health problems that plague many communities. In fact, land use law
may be the most important and powerful tool at local governments’ disposal
to create meaningful and positive impacts on our collective health. This
Article analyzes the different ways in which local governments are using
their general regulatory and land use powers to promote greater health
among their citizenry. Many of these health initiatives are controversial.
Critics view local government action in this sphere as infringing on a policy
area reserved for the federal and state governments or, at the very least,
exceeding local government powers. Accordingly, this Article will also
identify and address some of the challenges that such local government
efforts face.
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INTRODUCTION
There is an ongoing debate—both descriptive and normative—among
local government law scholars about whether local governments1 have, or
should have, robust or limited powers.2 This debate focuses largely on cities’
powers vis-à-vis their respective state governments. This scholarly
discourse has provided a forum for the rise of localism, a theory based on a
preference for local government control and authority.3 While this localist
focus has been driven by a number of concerns and influences such as
efficiency and self-government,4 one of the primary motivations is the
prospect that local governments will further innovative policy initiatives that
could inform policy- and decision-making at higher levels of government.5
Indeed, due to the political strife and gridlock that exists at the state and
federal government levels, local governments, in many respects, are better
“laborator[ies] of democracy” than Justice Louis Brandeis envisioned the
states to be.6

1. In this article, I use the terms local governments, cities, suburbs, municipalities, and
localities interchangeably to refer to local government entities.
2. See Daniel B. Rodriguez, Localism and Lawmaking, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 627, 632-35
(2001); see also Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I—The Structure of Local Government
Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 16-20 (1990).
3. See Sheryll D. Cashin, Localism, Self-Interest, and the Tyranny of the Favored
Quarter: Addressing the Barriers to New Regionalism, 88 GEO. L.J. 1985, 1988 (2000).
4. See Jerry Frug, Decentering Decentralization, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 253, 294-99 (1993).
5. See Richard C. Schragger, Decentralization and Development, 96 VA. L. REV. 1837,
1859-63 (2010). See generally Brian Galle & Joseph Leahy, Laboratories of Democracy?
Policy Innovation in Decentralized Governments, 58 EMORY L.J. 1333 (2009).
6. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if
its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments
without risk to the rest of the country.”).
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As Professor Charles Tiebout describes in his seminal theory, local
governments have tended to be more innovative than states because they
compete against each other to attract and retain consumer-voters.7
Consumer-voters can “vote with their feet” and leave one city for another if
the package of goods, services, and taxes offered by a particular municipality
is not to their liking.8 Accordingly, local governments compete with one
another by providing residents and businesses with a distinct set of policies,
regulations, services, and the like to respond to the needs and interests of
consumer-voters.9 This dynamic creates an efficient local government
marketplace where people with similar values and preferences tend to locate
in the same municipalities.10 Such homogeneity provides local governments
with the ability to experiment with policies that might not be politically
viable at other levels of government.11 Thus, local governments have pushed
innovative policies that could not gain traction on the state or federal level
in areas such as marriage equality,12 climate change,13 immigration,14
marijuana legalization,15 and raising the minimum wage.16
One area where local governments have become particularly active in
recent years is health policy. This development is noteworthy as an example
of local government innovation and experimentation, since health policy has

7. See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416,
419 (1956).
8. See id. at 418. But see Erin Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War Within: Seeking
Checks and Balances in the Interjurisdictional Gray Area, 66 MD. L. REV. 503, 615 (2007)
(questioning how easily people can move given the expense of moving, proximity to family,
and other reasons); Richard C. Schragger, Cities, Economic Development, and the Free Trade
Constitution, 94 VA. L. REV. 1091, 1115 (2008) (explaining why residents are not as mobile
as Tiebout theorized).
9. See Tiebout, supra note 7, at 419-20.
10. See Rick Su, A Localist Reading of Local Immigration Regulations, 86 N.C. L. REV.
1619, 1628-32 (2008).
11. See generally Richard Briffault, Home Rule and Local Political Innovation, 22 J.L. &
POL. 1 (2006).
12. See Richard C. Schragger, Cities as Constitutional Actors: The Case of Same-Sex
Marriage, 21 J.L. & POL. 147, 148-53 (2005) (detailing the City and County of San
Francisco’s provision of marriage licenses to same-sex couples and the attendant role of local
governments to act in this policy area).
13. See Hari M. Osofsky & Janet Koven Levit, The Scale of Networks?: Local Climate
Change Coalitions, 8 CHI. J. INT’L L. 409, 410-11 (2008) (describing how many cities in the
United States took direct action to address harmful emissions).
14. See Rick Su, Local Fragmentation as Immigration Regulation, 47 HOUS. L. REV. 367,
371-405 (2010) (analyzing local government immigration regulation).
15. See generally Patricia E. Salkin & Zachary Kansler, Medical Marijuana Meets
Zoning: Can You Grow, Sell, and Smoke That Here?, 62 PLAN. & ENVTL. L. 4 (2010)
(detailing cities’ laws related to medical marijuana).
16. See David Neumark, Living Wages: Protection for or Protection From Low-Wage
Workers, 58 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 27, 28-29 (2004) (detailing various cities’ living wage
laws).
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traditionally been the domain of the federal and state governments.17 In
response to increasing societal health problems—ones that other levels of
governments have been unsuccessful in addressing—many municipalities
have begun using their general regulatory and land use powers to attempt to
improve the health of their residents. These efforts have ranged from the
adoption of a universal health care law, as in San Francisco,18 to the new
urbanism movement—an approach that seeks to reduce the reliance on
automobiles and promote community integration through pedestrianfriendly, mixed-use development—that have taken root in many American
cities.19 This kind of local government policy experimentation exemplifies
the innovation that localism scholars advocate, even though—as discussed
further below—it is often met with political resistance and legal challenges.
This Article seeks to highlight the evolution of health policy on a local
level and situate it in local government and land use scholarship. Part I
explains the reasons why various municipalities have focused on healthrelated matters. Part II analyzes the ways in which local governments have
used their general regulatory and land use powers to positively impact the
health of those who live and work within their boundaries. Part III addresses
some of the challenges that these local health policy efforts face, and the
Article’s Conclusion provides some final thoughts.
I. THE HEALTH CONCERNS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
Local governments are increasingly focused on health policy in response
to the growing body of evidence that illustrates the impact of the built
environment20 on the health of individuals in a community.21 Specifically,
urban sprawl—and its attendant “complex pattern of land use, transportation,
and social and economic development”22—has contributed to public health
issues such as obesity and asthma.

17. See Abbe R. Gluck, Federalism from Federal Statutes: Health Reform, Medicaid, and
the Old-Fashioned Federalists’ Gamble, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1749, 1752 (2013).
18. See Brian P. Goldman, Note, The San Francisco Health Care Security Ordinance:
Universal Health Care Beyond ERISA’s Reach?, 19 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 361, 362-67
(2008).
19. See Morgan E. Rog, Note, Highway to the Danger Zone: Urban Sprawl, Land Use,
and the Environment, 22 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 707, 717-19 (2010).
20. See Denis J. Brion, The Meaning of the City: Urban Redevelopment and the Loss of
Community, 25 IND. L. REV. 685, 710-11 (1991) (explaining that the built environment is the
physical space where people live, work, and play—those communities that we have physically
built and populate).
21. See Paul A. Diller, Why Do Cities Innovate in Public Health? Implications of Scale
and Structure, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 1219, 1221-23 (2014).
22. See Howard Frumkin, Urban Sprawl and Public Health, 117 PUB. HEALTH REP. 201,
201 (2002).
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A. Obesity
There is an obesity epidemic both globally and in the United States.23 In
the United States, more than one-third of adults are considered obese.24 One
study found that in 2010, forty-three million preschool children globally
were considered obese or overweight—constituting a sixty percent increase
in the past two decades.25 Moreover, low-income, minority, and rural
communities experience higher than average rates of disease related to
obesity.26 The costs of obesity on the American health care system are
estimated to be between $147 billion and $210 billion annually.27 Moreover,
the chronic diseases associated with obesity—including diabetes and heart
disease—are among the leading causes of death in the United States.28 This
obesity epidemic is not confined to the United States. The worldwide obesity
rate has almost doubled since 1980,29 and one international study projected
that by 2025, twenty percent of the world’s population will be obese.30
To be sure, there are many causes of obesity, including factors such as a
person’s diet and genetic make-up. Nonetheless, in recent years, public
health experts, urban planners, and local government officials have come to
understand the ways in which the built environment of many metropolitan
regions contributes to the increase in obesity rates.31 Indeed, as some

23. See Tamara Schulman, Note, Menu Labeling: Knowledge for a Healthier America, 47
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 587, 587 (2010).
24. See Adult Obesity Facts, CTRS. DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.
gov/obesity/data/adult.html [https://perma.cc/YC5H-P6RV] (citing Cynthia L. Ogden et. al.,
Prevalence of Obesity Among Adults and Youth: United States, 2011-2014, NCHS data brief,
no 219, (2015)).
25. See Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health, Obesity Trends: Tracking the Global
Epidemic, HARV. SCH. OF PUB. HEALTH, http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/obesity-preventionsource/obesity-trends/#ref1 [https://perma.cc/X9AF-VYWZ]; see also Jennifer L. Harris &
Samantha K. Graff, Protecting Children from Harmful Food Marketing: Options for Local
Government to Make a Difference, 8 PREVENTING CHRONIC DISEASE 1, 2-3 (2011) (describing
how food marketing leads to greater childhood obesity).
26. See Access to Healthy Foods in Low-Income Neighborhoods, YALE UNIV. RUDD
CENTER FOR FOOD POL’Y & OBESITY 1, 2 (2008), http://www.ct.gov/dph/lib/dph/hems/
nutrition/pdf/yale_rudd_center_access_to_healthy_foods_report_2008.pdf [https://perma.cc/
HB68-9EYJ].
27. See The Healthcare Costs of Obesity, THE STATE OF OBESITY, http://stateofobesity.
org/healthcare-costs-obesity/ [https://perma.cc/Q9AL-LSR7].
28. See Marice Ashe et al., Prevention and Treatment: Solutions Beyond the Individual,
35 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 138, 138 (2007).
29. HOWARD FRUMKIN et al., URBAN SPRAWL AND PUBLIC HEALTH: DESIGNING, PLANNING
AND BUILDING FOR HEALTH COMMUNITIES, at xi, xiv (2004).
30. See Joshua Berlinger, 1 in 5 People Will Be Obese by 2025, Study Says, CNN (Apr.
6, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/04/01/health/global-obesity-study/ [https://perma.cc/
X42F-EFAR].
31. See William L. Roper et al., Heath and Smart Growth: Building Health, Promoting
Active Communities, FUNDER’S NETWORK FOR SMART GROWTH AND LIVABLE COMMUNITIES
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scholars have posited that “[t]he modern America of obesity [and]
inactivity . . . has not happened to us. We legislated, subsidized, and planned
it this way.”32 Even if such results were not deliberately designed, there is
no doubt that the way in which cities permit and incentivize land use directly
impacts the health of those in their communities.33
Urban sprawl in particular seems to be a contributing factor to the obesity
epidemic. As one reporter quipped, “[a]s communities sprawl into
automobile-dependent developments and suburbs, so do their residents’
waistlines spread.”34 Urban sprawl has been characterized by four key
features: a widely-dispersed population in a low-density development;
homes, shops, and workplaces that are distinctly separated; a network of
roads with large blocks and poor access; and a lack of identifiable activity
centers such as a downtown area.35 These characteristics, in turn, inevitably
lead to—or correspond with—a lack of public transportation, a strong
reliance on automobiles, and a decrease in neighborhood schools and
recreational opportunities.36
This increase in automobile dependence and the lack of meaningful public
transportation options have led to a more sedentary culture in the United
States.37 With longer distances to schools, workplaces, and other
destinations, more Americans have turned to their cars to fulfill their
transportation needs.38 In this regard, urban sprawl has led to a decrease in
walking and bicycling and an increase in automobile usage as a form of
transportation.39 In fact, research shows that more than 90% of all trips in
the United States are made by automobiles, even though 28% of those trips
were for fewer than one mile and an additional 13% of trips were for fewer

1, 2 (2003), http://www.fundersnetwork.org/files/learn/Health_and_Smart_Growth.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7JL6-XTL9].
32. See FRUMKIN, supra note 29, at xi.
33. See Roper, supra note 31, at 2.
34. Jim Shamp, Study: Less Need for Cars Drops Weight, Blood Pressure, HERALD-SUN,
Aug. 29, 2003, at B1.
35. See Alyson L. Geller, Smart Growth: A Prescription for Livable Cities, 93 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH 1410, 1410 (2003).
36. See id. Given the development of urban sprawl, localities find it challenging—if not
impossible—to create public transportation systems that can work both logistically and within
limited budgets.
37. See id. at 1410-11.
38. See Joe Baird, CDC Calls Sprawl a Health Risk: Poor City Planning Linked to
Diabetes and Asthma, SALT LAKE CITY TRIB., Nov. 2, 2002, at A1.
39. See Frumkin, supra note 22, at 205.

2017]

HEALTHY ZONING

39

than two miles.40 Even leisurely physical activity appears to have lessened
due to urban sprawl.41
The lack of access to healthy foods in many urban communities has also
led to an increase in obesity rates in those communities. As urban sprawl
took root, families moved to the suburbs and so did many of the retail and
grocery stores that had previously served various communities within the
city.42 The disappearance of grocery stores in many urban communities
created “food deserts”—areas within cities where low-income residents have
limited access to healthy food options, such as fruits, vegetables, and nonprocessed foods.43 Many low-income residents lack access to reliable
transportation—public or private—to access grocery stores in the suburbs,
and thus resort to shopping for food at convenience stores, liquor stores, or
fast-food restaurants.44 These options provide mostly high-calorie, high-fat
food options.45 It should come as no surprise that communities marked as
food deserts tend to have higher rates of obesity and other attendant health
problems because of this lack of access to healthy food options.
B. Asthma
The built environment in many communities—and, specifically, those
marked by urban sprawl—also negatively impacts those suffering from
asthma and other respiratory ailments. Approximately twenty-four million
Americans suffer from asthma.46 While asthma rates have been increasing
in the United States, the disease disproportionately affects low-income,
minority communities in major urban centers.47 However, even in the
suburbs, the lack of physical activity and the automobile-dependency

40. JAMES A. KUSHNER, HEALTHY CITIES: THE INTERSECTION OF
AND HEALTH, at 110 (2007).

URBAN PLANNING, LAW

41. See Bradford McKee, As Suburbs Grow, So Do Waistlines, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2003,
at F1.
42. See M. Nathaniel Mead, Urban Issues: The Sprawl of the Food Desert, 116 ENVIRON.
HEALTH PERSPECT. A335, A335 (2008).
43. See id. Approximately twenty-nine million people in the United States live in
communities that lack access to healthy food options. See Deborah L. Rhode, Obesity and
Public Policy: A Roadmap for Reform, 22 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 491, 497 (2015).
44. See Kate Meals, Comment, Nurturing the Seeds of Food Justice: Unearthing the
Impact of Institutionalized Racism on Access to Healthy Food in Urban African-American
Communities, 15 SCHOLAR 97, 121-22 (2012).
45. See Kelli K. Garcia, The Fat Fight: The Risks and Consequences of the Federal
Government’s Failing Public Health Campaign, 112 PENN ST. L. REV. 529, 540 (2007).
46. See Asthma, CTRS. DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/
fastats/asthma.htm [https://perma.cc/KQG5-NHK5] (noting that 17.7 million adults and 6.3
million children suffer from asthma).
47. See Alina Das, The Asthma Crisis in Low-Income Communities of Color: Using the
Law as a Tool for Promoting Public Health, 31 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 273, 276-81
(2007).
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detailed above puts people at greater risk for respiratory ailments.48 Despite
the decrease in automobile emissions in recent years, automobiles are still
the greatest source of air pollution because the number of cars and trucks on
the road—and the number of miles that they drive—has increased.49 In fact,
motor vehicles are responsible for somewhere between a third and a half of
smog in most metropolitan regions.50 Such air pollution leads to a “higher
incidence and severity of respiratory symptoms, worse lung function, more
emergency room visits and hospitalizations, more medication use, and more
absenteeism from school and work.”51 In these regards, the built
environment and urban sprawl have negatively impacted the respiratory
health of those living and working in many communities.
II. LOCAL GOVERNMENTS’ INNOVATIVE HEALTH POLICY INITIATIVES
Historically, local governments waded into health policy largely to
address unsanitary conditions and to ward off outbreaks of diseases such as
cholera and tuberculosis.52 In the 19th and early 20th centuries, public health
officials and urban planners worked together to create sewer systems and
design zoning plans to keep certain unsanitary land uses away from schools
and homes.53 By the middle of the 20th century, the threats of inadequate
sanitation and infectious diseases had subsided, and public health officials
shifted their focus away from land use to food safety, venereal diseases, and
prenatal and early childhood health care.54 However, with the rise of urban
sprawl—and the attendant chronic health problems to which it contributed—
local government officials have refocused on using their general regulatory
and land use powers to improve public health within their jurisdictions.55
A. Non-Land Use Health Policies on the Local Level
In recent years, local governments have implemented non-land use
regulations to promote healthier eating by those who eat within their
boundaries. While food regulation is oftentimes viewed as the domain of the
state and federal governments, various municipalities have found innovative

48. See Kushner, supra note 40, at 3.
49. See Frumkin, supra note 22, at 202.
50. See Geller, supra note 35, at 1411.
51. See Frumkin, supra note 22, at 202.
52. See Wendy C. Perdue et al., Public Health and the Built Environment: Historical,
Empirical, and Theoretical Foundations for an Expanded Role, 31 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 557,
557-58 (2003).
53. See id. at 558.
54. See id. at 558-59.
55. See Juliana Maantay, Public Health Matters: Zoning, Equity, and Public Health, 91
AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1033, 1033 (2001).
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ways to counter negative health trends in their communities through menulabeling laws, and bans on “happy meals,” sugary sodas, and trans-fats.
1. Menu-Labeling Laws
In response to the obesity epidemic, many cities adopted menu-labeling
laws to help consumers make healthier—and better-informed—food
choices.56 Studies have shown that most people, including nutritionists,
underestimate the amount of calories in some foods.57 Such underestimation
leads people to perceive oversized, high-calorie portions as being normalsized portions, and thus unknowingly eat far more calories than they
originally anticipated.58 To combat this phenomenon, and encourage wellinformed nutritional decision-making, many local governments have
adopted laws that mandate disclosure of the amount of calories for each item
on a restaurant’s menu.59 In 2006, New York City became the first city to
adopt a menu-labeling law.60 The New York City regulation required that
menus display the calorie content value for menu items served in
standardized portions.61 The law applied to any group of fifteen or more
food service establishments doing business nationally under the same name
and offering the substantially same items on their menus.62 Failure to
comply with the new requirements earned a restaurant a fine between $200
and $2000.63
This movement to educate eaters on their caloric intake soon proliferated
among municipalities throughout the United States.64 While the specifics of
these laws varied somewhat by jurisdiction, these laws generally targeted
larger chain restaurants for at least three reasons. First, restaurant chains

56. See Ashley Arthur, Note, Combating Obesity: Our Country’s Need for a National
Standard to Replace the Growing Patchwork of Local Menu Labeling Laws, 7 IND. HEALTH
L. REV. 305, 314 (2010).
57. See Christine Cusick, Comment, Menu-Labeling Laws: A Move from Local to
National Regulation, 51 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 989, 1017 (2011).
58. See id.
59. See Arthur, supra note 56, at 306.
60. See Jodi Schuette Green, Note, Cheeseburger in Paradise? An Analysis of How New
York State Restaurant Association v. New York City Board of Health May Reform Our Fast
Food Nation, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 733, 746 (2010).
61. See Brent Bernell, Article, The History and Impact of the New York City Menu
Labeling Law, 65 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 839, 845-46 (2010).
62. See id. at 845.
63. See Jason M. Szanyi, Brain Food: Bringing Psychological Insights to Bear on Modern
Nutrition Labeling Efforts, 65 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 159, 172 (2010).
64. See Michelle I. Banker, I Saw the Sign: The New Federal Menu-Labeling Law and
Lessons from Local Experience, 65 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 901, 908-09 (2010); see also Lainie
Rutkow et al., Preemption and the Obesity Epidemic: State and Local Menu Labeling Laws
and the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 772, 775-76 (2008)
(describing various state and local menu labeling laws).
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tend to use standardized menu items, making it easier to measure or estimate
accurate calories per serving.65 Second, chain restaurants also make up a
disproportionate share of restaurant meals in many cities.66 Third, chain
restaurants tend to serve less healthy food that can contribute to obesity.67
Interestingly, these local laws eventually influenced some states to adopt
similar menu-labeling laws.68 In fact, similar menu-labeling requirements
were incorporated into the federal Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act.69
2. “Happy Meal” Bans
San Francisco adopted an ordinance—known as the “happy meal” ban—
that aimed to prevent fast food restaurants from using toy incentives to target
children’s food preferences. Many fast food companies provide a free toy in
kids’ meals as an enticement to children to influence their parents to buy
them food at these establishments.70 These promotions can sometimes more
than double weekly sales of kids’ meals at these restaurants.71 The most
recognizable kids’ meal that has a toy incentive is McDonald’s Happy Meal,
which also happens to be among the unhealthiest kids’ meals.72
A bit of history regarding marketing junk food to children is helpful to
understand San Francisco’s impetus in adopting its “happy meal” law.
During the 1970s, the federal government—through the Federal Trade
Commission (“FTC”)—attempted to limit children’s exposure to marketing
and advertisements of unhealthy food options.73 Studies showed that
children under the age of six were particularly susceptible to such advertising
because their cognitive abilities were not sufficiently developed to
distinguish commercial advertising from program content.74
The
effectiveness of such advertising led fast food companies to spend more than

65. See N.Y.C. DEPT. OF HEALTH & MENTAL HYGIENE BD. OF HEALTH, NOTICE OF
ADOPTION OF A RESOLUTION TO REPEAL AND REENACT § 81.50 OF THE NEW YORK CITY
HEALTH CODE, http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/downloads/pdf/public/notice-adoption-hc-art
81-50-0108.pdf [https://perma.cc/C5N4-55KS].
66. See id.
67. See id.
68. See Banker, supra note 64, at 908.
69. See Lainie Rutkow et al., Local Governments and the Food System: Innovative
Approaches to Public Health Law and Policy, 22 ANNALS HEALTH L. 355, 357 (2013).
70. See Alexis M. Etow, Comment, No Toy for You! The Healthy Food Incentives
Ordinance: Paternalism or Consumer Protection?, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 1503, 1511 (2012).
71. See id.
72. See Cortney Price, Comment, The Real Toy Story: The San Francisco Board of
Supervisors Healthy Food Incentives Ordinance, 8 J. FOOD L. & POL’Y 347, 350 (2012).
73. See Etow, supra note 70, at 1509.
74. See id.
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$650 million each year on marketing aimed at children.75 However, despite
the problems it identified, the FTC eventually abandoned its proposed
regulations of junk food marketing because of the threat of legal challenges
and political resistance.76
In response to this link between unhealthy food and toy incentive
marketing to children—and due to the inability of other levels of government
to address this concern—San Francisco adopted the Healthy Food Incentives
Ordinance, now known as its “happy meal” ban.77 The ordinance bans
restaurants from providing toys, or other incentive items, with a kids’ meal
that does not meet certain nutritional guidelines.78 The stated purpose of the
law “is to improve the health of children and adolescents in San Francisco
by setting healthy nutritional standards for children’s meals sold at
restaurants in combination with free toys or other incentive items.”79
San Francisco’s law applies to all restaurants that provide take-out or “to
go” food services.80 In order for a restaurant to provide a toy or other
incentive item, the kid’s meal must not exceed 600 calories; 640 mg of
sodium; half a gram of trans fat; thirty-five percent of its total calories from
fat; and ten percent of its total calories from saturated fat.81 Moreover, the
kids’ meal must contain at least a half-cup of fruit and three-fourths of a cup
of vegetables.82 Accordingly, San Francisco’s “happy meal” ban is actually
more of an incentive system: that is, the ordinance provides incentives and
sets minimum standards encouraging fast food restaurants to provide
healthier menu options if they want to market to children through toys or
other giveaways.83 However, if a restaurant or other food service
establishment violates this law, San Francisco can impose a fine.84 While
there was not a proliferation of similar laws following the San Francisco
ordinance,85 the “happy meal” ban received much national attention and

75. See id. at 1505.
76. See id. at 1509.
77. See id. at 1512; see, e.g., Marisa Lagos, Happy Meals are Healthier After SF Law,
Researchers Find, SF GATE (July 17, 2014, 1:06 PM), http://blog.sfgate.com/cityinsider/
2014/07/17/happy-meals-are-healthier-after-sf-law-researchers-find/ [https://perma.cc/82KK
-BX4K].
78. See Etow, supra note 70, at 1512.
79. SAN FRANCISCO HEALTH CODE, art. 8 § 471.2 (effective Dec. 1, 2011).
80. See id. § 471.3(f).
81. See id. § 471.4(a)(1)-(5).
82. See id. § 471.4(a)(7).
83. See Price, supra note 72, at 354.
84. See SAN FRANCISCO HEALTH CODE, art. 8 § 471.5(a).
85. New York City did consider adopting a similar ordinance. See Mitch Lipka, NYC
Considers Banning Free Toys with Fatty Meals, CBS NEWS, Aug. 21, 2014,
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/new-york-city-to-consider-banning-free-toys-with-fattyfoods/ [https://perma.cc/UT3J-K5B9].
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raised awareness of the issue of unhealthy food options for children linked
to free toys or other incentive items.
3. Soda Bans
Other cities target another culprit that contributes to obesity, diabetes, and
heart disease problems facing their communities: sugary sodas.86 Following
the lead of some major school districts, several cities adopted soda
restrictions.87 New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg’s proposal to limit
the size of sugar-sweetened beverages sold in the city garnered a lot of
national media coverage.88 On September 13, 2012, the New York City
Board of Health approved the Mayor’s proposal to cap the size of sugarsweetened beverages sold in food service establishments to sixteen ounces
or less.89 The law applied to both carbonated and non-carbonated
beverages—even though it became popularly-known as a “soda ban”—that
exceed certain sweetening metrics.90 However, only food service and selfserve establishments are subject to the law, so businesses like 7-Elevens and
grocery stores are exempt.91 Businesses which violate the ordinance are
subject to a fine of up to $200.92 Other cities also adopted similar measures
to create healthier drink options for those in their jurisdictions.93

86. See Kara Marcello, Note, The New York City Sugar-Sweetened Beverage Portion Cap
Rule: Lawfully Regulating Public Enemy Number One in the Obesity Epidemic, 46 CONN. L.
REV. 807, 813-15 (2013).
87. See Michele Simon, Can Food Companies Be Trusted to Self-Regulate? An Analysis
of Corporate Lobbying and Deception to Undermine Children’s Health, 39 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
169, 174-78 (2006) (noting the soda ban implemented by the Los Angeles Unified School
District); Jason M. Solomon, New Governance, Preemptive Self-Regulation, and the Blurring
of Boundaries in Regulatory Theory and Practice, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 591, 610 (2010)
(describing the School District of Philadelphia’s soda ban); A. Bryan Endres & Nicholas R.
Johnson, United States Food Law Update: Moving Toward a More Balanced Food
Regulatory Regime, 7 J. FOOD L. & POL’Y 383, 393 (2011) (explaining that Chicago Public
Schools do not ban sodas district-wide; however, principals are afforded the discretion to ban
unhealthy drinks in their schools).
88. See, e.g., New York Soda Ban, HUFFINGTON POST, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
news/new-york-soda-ban/ [https://perma.cc/MG9X-VRF6] (listing numerous articles from
the Huffington Post on Mayor Bloomberg’s soda ban).
89. See Marcello, supra note 86, at 819.
90. See id. at 820.
91. See id. at 845.
92. See id. at 820.
93. See, e.g., Alison Peck, Revisiting the Original “Tea Party”: The Historical Roots of
Regulating Food Consumption in America, 80 UMKC L. REV. 1, 6-15 (2011) (describing
Boston and San Francisco’s efforts to ban sugar-sweetened beverages in municipal buildings
and on city property, respectively).
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4. Trans-Fat Bans
Cities have also used their general regulatory powers to target trans fats,
which are solid or semi-solid fats that have been converted from liquid
vegetable oils through partial hydrogenation.94 During the 20th century, the
use of trans fats became widespread: more than 45,000 food products—
including cookies, crackers, and frozen breakfast items—were made using
trans fats.95 Many food producers use trans fats because they are inexpensive
to use, improve taste and texture, and extend the shelf life of the foods.96
However, trans fats are one of the most problematic types of fat because they
contribute to a rise in “bad” cholesterol and a decrease in “good”
cholesterol.97 In response, several local governments moved to ban trans fats
in their jurisdictions. For example, after a voluntary trans-fat ban proved
unsuccessful, New York City adopted an ordinance in 2006 that required
restaurants to cease using trans fats by July 1, 2008.98 The law applied to
both sit-down restaurants and outdoor vendors.99 Several other cities and
states similarly adopted trans-fat bans,100 and the United States Food and
Drug Administration recently announced that it is moving forward with a
trans-fat ban.101
B. Local Land Use Policies Aimed at a Healthier Citizenry
While local governments have used their general regulatory powers to
adopt health policy ordinances, there may be no greater area where cities can
positively impact the health of those living and working within their
boundaries than land use planning. Perhaps this observation is unsurprising
given that, as one scholar notes, “land use is perhaps the most important
single power left to local governments.”102 Armed with the power of
94. See Elizabeth Young Spivey, Note, Trans Fat: Can New York City Save Its Citizens
from This “Metabolic Poison”?, 42 GA. L. REV. 273, 275-76 (2007).
95. See id. at 276.
96. See Katharine Kruk, Note, Of Fat People and Fundamental Rights: The
Constitutionality of the New York City Trans-Fat Ban, 18 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 857, 860
(2010).
97. See id. at 861.
98. See id. at 863.
99. See id. at 874.
100. See id. at 857-58.
101. See Alexandra Sifferlin, This is Why FDA is Banning Trans Fats, TIME, June 16, 2015,
http://time.com/3922629/this-is-why-fda-is-banning-trans-fats/ [https://perma.cc/A2WB-D9
3L].
102. Bradley C. Karkkainen, Comment, Biodiversity and Land, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 72
(1997); see also Kenneth J. Brown, Establishing a Buffer Zone: The Proper Balance Between
the First Amendment Religion Clauses in the Context of Neutral Zoning Regulations, 149 U.
PA. L. REV. 1507, 1509-10 (2001) (“There may be no power at the disposal of local
government more capable of affecting the rights and abilities of individuals and groups to
engage in a given activity than zoning”); Nicole Stelle Garnett, On Castles and Commerce:
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zoning—as an exercise of the police power reserved to the states by the Tenth
Amendment and delegated to local governments through most states’
constitutions or statutes103—cities have attempted to influence and regulate
the health of their citizenry. In particular, municipalities have focused on a
variety of land use approaches to accomplish this goal: adopting New
Urbanism and Smart Growth zoning strategies; incorporating health
elements into their general plans; providing incentives to open grocery stores
in food deserts; restricting access to fast food restaurants and liquor stores;
and experimenting with other innovative zoning approaches to encourage
access to healthy food. While “[l]and use planning in the United States has
been based on the segregation of uses by type primarily to prevent nuisance
or external costs,”104 cities have demonstrated how they can use their land
use powers to influence human behavior and thus effect health policy in a
meaningful way.105
1.

New Urbanism, Smart Growth, and Zoning

In response to urban sprawl and the rising rates of obesity, many cities are
embracing New Urbanism and Smart Growth approaches to zoning. New
Urbanism emphasizes design elements for the built environment that reduce
the reliance on automobiles and promote community integration through
higher density development, public transportation, public green spaces,
pedestrian-friendly development, and mixed-use neighborhoods.106 This
approach promotes the ability for people to live, work, and play, all in the
same community, thus increasing physical activity and reducing the need for
automobiles.107 In this regard, New Urbanism seeks to “afford[ ] an
opportunity for people to be active without the need to plan for physical
activity.”108 Similarly, Smart Growth is a land use planning movement that
promotes building and revitalizing communities through mixed-use, high-

Zoning Law and the Home-Business Dilemma, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1191, 1205 (2001)
(“land use is perhaps the quintessential local responsibility”).
103. See Paul A. Diller & Samantha Graff, Regulating Food Retail for Obesity Prevention:
How Far Can Cities Go?, 39 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 89, 90 (2011).
104. Dan Tarlock, Fat and Fried: Linking Land Use Law, the Risks of Obesity, and Climate
Change, 3 PITT J. ENVTL PUB. HEALTH L. 31, 35 (2009).
105. See E. Jacob Lubarsky, Article, Highway to Health: Exploring Legal Avenues to
Connecting General Plans and Public Health Standards, 1 GOLDEN GATE U. ENVTL. L.J. 405,
407-08 (2007).
106. See Timothy Polmateer, Note, How Localism’s Rationales Limit New Urbanism’s
Success and What Regionalism Can Do About It, 41 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1085, 1095-97
(2015).
107. See Robert H. Freilich & Neil M. Popowitz, The Umbrella of Sustainability: Smart
Growth, New Urbanism, Renewable Energy and Green Development in the 21st Century, 42
URB. LAW. 1, 3 (2010).
108. Shamp, supra note 34, at B1.
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density development.109 To that end, Smart Growth seeks “more efficient
use of existing infrastructure, and transportation choices.”110 Moreover, this
land use approach aims to advance public health and healthier communities
through neighborhood designs—or redesigns—that encourage biking and
walking.111
The New Urbanism and Smart Growth movements have made significant
strides in recent years.112 While critics remain,113 one only needs to look at
most major cities—and many smaller and mid-size cities—to see the
influence of these anti-sprawl, growth management approaches. Cities
advance these types of developments for a variety of reasons, but one of their
motivations is to improve the health of those who live and work within their
boundaries.
2.

Health Elements in General Plans

Some cities have extended the theories behind the New Urbanism and
Smart Growth movements to their general plans114 by incorporating public
health goals into them.115 A general plan is a city’s “policy guide to
decisions about the physical development of the community.”116 General
plans are forward-looking and seek to create objectives and parameters
regarding “how, why, when and where to build, rebuild, and preserve the
city.”117 Many states require municipalities to develop such plans for zoning
and land use development, including general policies—commonly referred
to as elements—to help meet a community’s varying needs. These elements
explain the physical development of the city—both in its current state and in
109. See Geller, supra note 35, at 1411.
110. See id.
111. See Patricia E. Salkin, Squaring the Circle on Sprawl: What More Can We Do?
Progress Toward Sustainable Land Use in the States, 16 WIDENER L.J. 787, 789 (2007).
112. See Michael Lewyn, The (Somewhat) False Hope of Comprehensive Planning, 37 U.
HAW. L. REV. 39, 45-49 (2015).
113. See Steve P. Calandrillo et al., Making “Smart Growth” Smarter, 83 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 829, 850-67 (2015).
114. For the purposes of this article, I use the term “general plan” to refer to both general
plans and comprehensive plans.
115. See Peter Stair et al., How to Create and Implement Healthy General Plans: A Toolkit
for Building Healthy, Vibrant Communities, CHANGELAB SOLUTIONS, IX, 31 (2012),
http://www.changelabsolutions.org/sites/default/files/Healthy_General_Plans_Toolkit_Upda
ted_20120517_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/MAV5-BYA9].
116. ROBERT M. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING 1, 172 (1986). Indeed, there are
differing perspectives on what a general plan is or should be: a land use vision, blueprint,
remedy, or process. See William C. Baer, General Plan Evaluation Criteria: An Approach to
Make Better Plans, 63 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 329, 333-34 (1997).
117. Laura F. Ashley, Comment, Re-Building New Orleans: How the Big Easy Can Be the
Next Big Example, 55 LOY. L. REV. 353, 358-59 (2009) (quoting FRANK BEAL & ELIZABETH
HOLLANDER, CITY DEVELOPMENT PLANS, IN THE PRACTICE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT PLANNING
153 (1979)).
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the community’s aspirations for future development.118 While states require
different elements, all general plans include land use and public facilities
elements.119 Some general plans include elements covering economic
development, natural resources, housing, and population and
demographics.120
In recent years, some cities have added health elements to their general
plans.121 The City of Richmond, California, was the first city to do so.122 In
2007, Richmond received a grant from the California Endowment Trust to
develop a health element to address issues such as diabetes, obesity, and
asthma faced by its residents.123 Richmond’s health element makes key
findings related to its community’s collective health, including the need for
more park space, access to healthy food, emergency services, usable public
transportation, and walkable neighborhoods, as well as the existence of
noise, water, air, and soil pollution.124 The element then sets forth healthrelated goals that should inform and influence the city’s zoning and land use
decision-making: improving access to parks and other recreational open
space; expanding access to healthy food options; enhancing medical
services; providing safe and reliable public transportation; improving
environmental quality; and adopting green and sustainable development and
practices.125 To implement such goals, the health element also contains
policies and actions meant to achieve consistency and success across the
city.126
Since Richmond began pursuing a health element in 2007, other cities
have adopted health elements into their general plans.127 This growing trend
signals an awareness of cities’ ability to influence health policy through their

118. See Craig Anthony Arnold, Planning Milagros: Environmental Justice and Land Use
Regulation, 76 DENV. L. REV. 1, 92 (1998).
119. See JAMES A. KUSHNER, HEALTHY CITIES: THE INTERSECTION OF URBAN PLANNING,
LAW AND HEALTH 1, 20 (2007).
120. See Ed Bolen et al., Smart Growth: A Review of Programs State by State, 8 HASTINGS
W.-N.W. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 145, 213 (2002).
121. See General Plan Update, HEAL CITIES CAMPAIGN, http://www.healcitiescampaign.
org/general_plan.html [https://perma.cc/5N5F-D372] (noting cities with health elements in
their general plans).
122. See Community Health and Wellness, City of Richmond General Plan Element 11,
CITY OF RICHMOND, http://www.ci.richmond.ca.us/DocumentCenter/Home/View/8579
[https://perma.cc/5275-SKS8].
123. See Christopher Connelly, Richmond Plans for a Healthier Future, RICHMOND
CONFIDENTIAL, June 7, 2011, http://richmondconfidential.org/2011/06/07/richmond-plansfor-a-healthier-future/ [https://perma.cc/YLG4-EA3R].
124. See CITY OF RICHMOND, supra note 122, at 11.12-15.
125. See id. at 11.16-17.
126. See id. at 11.19-63.
127. See HEAL CITIES CAMPAIGN, supra note 121 (noting cities that have adopted health
elements).
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zoning and land use powers. By incorporating a health element into their
general plan, these cities have provided not just a policy preference, but a
legal basis for improving the health of their citizenry.
3.

Siting Grocery Stores in Food Deserts

In addition to their general plans, cities are using their zoning powers in
an attempt to increase resident access to healthy foods. As detailed above,
many low-income communities lack access to grocery stores and other
establishments that provide healthy food options—creating the phenomenon
of the food desert.128 There are significant obstacles facing cities that seek
to attract grocery stores into these neighborhoods. For example, full-service
supermarkets require up to 150,000 square feet.129 Moreover, grocery stores
require a substantial number of parking spaces, and there are rarely vacant
lots available in urban areas to accommodate these kinds of square footage
and parking needs.130
Despite these challenges, many cities have found creative ways to use
their zoning and land use powers to provide incentives for grocery stores to
locate in their food deserts. For example, New York City established the
Food Retail Expansion to Support Health (“FRESH”) initiative for the
purpose of “establish[ing] and expan[ding] neighborhood grocery stores in
underserved communities by providing zoning and financial incentives.”131
In addition to providing tax and other financial incentives (like low-interest
loans), the FRESH program uses zoning to encourage grocery stores to locate
in certain neighborhoods: reducing the parking required for grocery stores
and permitting grocery stores as of right in light manufacturing districts.132
Similarly, Philadelphia created incentives for grocery stores that carry a
qualifying percentage of fresh foods.133 Philadelphia not only exempts fresh
food supermarkets from floor area limits, but it provides such stores with an
additional 25,000 in permitted square footage.134 Philadelphia also exempts
grocery stores from minimum parking requirements for the first 10,000
square feet of the store.135
128. See discussion supra Part I.A.
129. See Caitlin Loftus, An Apple a Day – If You Can Find One – Keeps the Doctor Away:
How Food Deserts Hurt America’s Health and How Effective Land Use Regulation Can
Eliminate Them, 35 ZONING & PLAN. L. REP. 1 (2012).
130. See id.
131. Food Retail Expansion to Support Health (FRESH), N.Y.C. ECON. DEV. CORP.,
http://www.nycedc.com/program/food-retail-expansion-support-health-fresh
[https://perma.cc/NT2S-YFLR].
132. See id.
133. See Lisa M. Feldstein, Zoning and Land Use Controls: Beyond Agriculture, 65 ME.
L. REV. 467, 482 (2013).
134. See id.
135. See id.
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Baltimore also sought to attract more grocery stores. Baltimore amended
its general plan to include a goal that all residents should live within one and
a half miles from a quality grocery store.136 Through the use of its zoning
powers, Baltimore was able to attract nineteen new grocery stores from 2000
to 2011.137 Finally, even smaller cities have adopted zoning measures to
help site grocery stores in their jurisdiction. The City of Santa Rosa,
California, changed its zoning requirements in 2012 to allow grocery stores
to locate in any commercial district without a conditional use permit—
clearing a significant hurdle for developers in the land use entitlement
process.138 As these examples demonstrate, cities have identified the public
health crisis that food deserts create and have responded by using their land
use and zoning powers to create incentives for supermarkets to locate in these
low-income neighborhoods.
4.

Restricting Fast Food Restaurants and Liquor Stores

While cities have created more lenient zoning regulations to attract
grocery stores, they have also limited the ability of fast food restaurants and
liquor stores to locate within their boundaries.139 Municipalities recognized
the link between these types of establishments and obesity rates and sought
to avoid a proliferation of them in their communities. Some cities banned
fast food restaurants within their jurisdiction.140 For example, in 1981,
Concord, Massachusetts, banned all fast food restaurants and restaurants
with drive-thru services.141 Other cities banned all chain restaurants—
whether they serve fast food or not—in designated areas or throughout their
communities (though they almost always grandfathered in existing
businesses as permissible nonconforming uses).142 In 2008, Los Angeles
implemented a one-year moratorium on new fast food restaurants in the
South Los Angeles neighborhood143 before banning the development of new

136. See Patricia E. Salkin & Amy Lavine, Regional Foodsheds: Are Our Local Zoning
and Land Use Regulations Healthy?, 22 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 599, 612 (2011).
137. See id.
138. See Feldstein, supra note 133, at 483.
139. See Jim Smith, Note, Encouraging the Growth of Urban Agriculture in Trenton and
Newark Through Amendments to the Zoning Codes: A Proven Approach to Addressing the
Persistence of Food Deserts, 14 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 71, 72 (2012) (noting that many living in
food deserts buy their food at convenience or liquor stores, neither of which generally have
very healthy food options).
140. See Micah L. Berman, From Health Care Reform to Public Health Reform, 39 J. L.
MED. & ETHICS 328, 335 (2011).
141. See Feldstein, supra note 133, at 476.
142. See id.
143. See Allyson C. Spacht, Note, The Zoning Diet: Using Restrictive Zoning to Shrink
American Waistlines, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 391, 392 (2009) (describing the moratorium).
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fast food restaurants in low-income areas in 2011.144 Other cities have
created minimum distance requirements between fast food restaurants and
schools to limit the density of fast food restaurants in their neighborhoods.145
Municipalities have also sought to limit the proliferation of liquor stores.
After the 1992 Los Angeles civil unrest, residents and community groups
circulated petitions opposing the rebuilding of more than 200 liquor stores
that had been destroyed.146 In particular, residents sought to require a
conditional use permit—a discretionary approval that ensures compatibility
with surrounding land uses—to rebuild each of the stores.147 In response,
the city required that owners seeking to rebuild their liquor stores meet
specific conditions, such as guaranteeing additional security measures and
limiting the amount of floor space dedicated to alcohol sales.148 As a result,
most of the liquor stores were not rebuilt.149 Following the Los Angeles
example, Sacramento and San Marino passed similar ordinances to quell the
proliferation of liquor stores in their communities.150 Other cities adopted
other ordinances creating buffer zones around schools, limiting how close a
liquor store could be to a school. Others restricted liquor stores’ operations,
mandating they maintain certain hours of operation, and keep the store well
lit and free of litter and graffiti.151 Other cities tried a dispersion approach:
the City of Bell, California, implemented a law that required a minimum of
300 feet between each liquor store.152
While there are multiple reasons for these fast food and liquor store
ordinances—including preserving neighborhood character or protecting
local businesses—the health goals underlying them obviously play a role in
their adoption, even when they are not always explicitly acknowledged.153
In fact, the Los Angeles fast food moratorium in 2008 explicitly identified
the desire to attract healthier food options such as grocery stores and sit-

144. See Emily M. Broad Lieb, All (Food) Politics is Local: Increasing Food Access
Through Local Government Action, 7 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 321, 340 (2013) (detailing the
city’s subsequent ban).
145. See Feldstein, supra note 133, at 477.
146. See Marice Ashe et al., Land Use Laws and Access to Tobacco, Alcohol, and Fast
Food, 35 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 60, 61 (2007).
147. See Shelley Ross Saxer, “Down with the Demon Drink!:” Strategies for Resolving
Liquor Outlet Overconcentration in Urban Areas, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 123, 158-59
(1994).
148. See id. at 159-60.
149. See id. at 160.
150. See id. at 164.
151. See Stair et al., supra note 115, at 56.
152. See Saxer, supra note 147, at 165.
153. See Christine Fry et. al., Healthy Reform, Healthy Cities: Using Law and Policy to
Reduce Obesity Rates in Underserved Communities, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1265, 1266-67
(2013).
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down restaurants to combat the detrimental health effects of over
concentrated fast food restaurants in the southern portion of the city.154 This
example provides a largely unspoken, though clearly well-known concern
for cities: to improve the health of its citizens, a city may need to more
carefully regulate the fast food restaurants and liquor stores that contribute
to unhealthy lifestyles.
5.

Other Innovative Land Use and Zoning Approaches to Health Policy

In addition to employing traditional zoning and land use powers, some
cities have experimented with innovative approaches to improving
community health, such as promoting urban agriculture through their zoning
codes. Urban agriculture is “the process of growing and distributing food
and other edible products through plant cultivation and animal husbandry
within and around city limits.”155 This broad term encompasses activities
such as community gardens, backyard farming, and urban beekeeping.156
Some cities view urban agriculture as part of the solution to food deserts
because it promotes the availability of fresh foods in the communities in
which the foods are grown and raised.157 However, many cities’ current
zoning regulations impede urban agriculture by restricting livestock, urban
gardens, the sale of farm products, and even the height of vegetation.158
In response, some cities have amended their zoning codes to encourage
urban agriculture. For example, some local governments allow residents to
keep chickens on their properties in order to provide a sustainable and
affordable source of fresh eggs.159 Baltimore amended its zoning to permit
beekeeping so long as each hive is placed on a parcel of at least 2500 square
feet.160 Other cities allowing urban beekeeping addressed concerns
regarding the potential disruption to neighbors by imposing setback
requirements on hives.161 Some cities have loosened their zoning restrictions
to permit livestock in urban areas, though with distinct setback and minimum
lot size requirements.162
154. See Spacht, supra note 143, at 393.
155. Elizabeth G. Berg, Comment, Bringing Food Back Home: Revitalizing the
Postindustrial American City Through State and Local Policies Promoting Urban
Agriculture, 92 OR. L. REV. 783, 784 (2014).
156. See id. at 784-85.
157. See Broad Leib, supra note 144, at 322, 332-33.
158. See Kate A. Voigt, Note, Pigs in the Backyard or the Barnyard: Removing Zoning
Impediments to Urban Agriculture, 38 B.C. ENVTL AFF. L. REV. 537, 538 (2011); see also
Berg, supra note 155, at 783, 806.
159. See Salkin & Lavine, supra note 136, at 620.
160. See Berg, supra note 155, at 813.
161. See id. (noting that setback requirements prescribe the distance that a home on the
property must be away from the street).
162. See Salkin & Lavine, supra note 136, at 621.
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Many municipalities have also sought to spur community gardens through
changes to their zoning codes or their general plans. For example, the City
of Glendale, California, adopted an ordinance that permitted community
gardens in residential districts organized by homeowners’ associations.163
Glendale also permitted them by right in commercial and mixed-use districts,
when run by non-profit organizations.164 Similarly, Denver amended its
zoning code to permit urban gardening, as well as commercial gardening,
within all zoning districts.165 Seattle also changed its zoning to allow
community gardens in all of its zones.166 Likewise, “Chicago amended its
zoning ordinance to allow ‘community gardens’ up to 25,000 square feet”
by right within residential zones and urban farms greater than 25,000 square
feet in non-residential zones.167 Detroit took a different approach,
identifying vacant land to be used for community gardens as a goal in its
general plan.168
As a consequence of these efforts to grow more sustainable, fresh food in
their own communities, cities have also had to manage the food’s sales and
distribution. To do so, municipalities have reformed their zoning codes to
permit street vendors, farmers’ markets, and farm stands.169 Portland,
Oregon, relaxed its zoning restrictions on street vendors so that vendors can
sell on any sidewalk within a commercial zone, as long as they comply with
certain cart width requirements, maintain a minimum distance from building
entrances, and obtain the permission of the building owners.170 San
Francisco now allows farmers’ markets in city parks, subject to
Local governments have also loosened
administrative approval.171
restrictions on farm stands. For example, Kansas City and Seattle allow farm
stands with few restrictions, while Berkeley amended its zoning code to
allow produce to be sold in residential areas as an accessory use.172

163. See id. at 615.
164. See id.
165. See Berg, supra note 155, at 811.
166. See Jim Smith, Note, Encouraging the Growth of Urban Agriculture in Trenton and
Newark Through Amendments to the Zoning Codes: A Proven Approach to Addressing the
Persistence of Food Deserts, 14 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 71, 85 (2012).
167. See Broad Leib, supra note 144, at 338.
168. See Berg, supra note 155, at 807.
169. See Broad Leib, supra note 144, at 335-38.
170. See Alfonso Morales & Gregg Kettles, Healthy Food Outside: Farmers’ Markets,
Taco Trucks, and Sidewalk Fruit Vendors, 26 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 20, 34-35
(2009).
171. See Salkin & Lavine, supra note 136, at 619.
172. See id. at 618; Jeffrey P. LeJava & Michael J. Goonan, Zoning and Land Use
Planning, 41 REAL EST. L.J. 216, 229-30 (2012) (noting that accessory uses are incidental uses
to the primary permitted use allowed on a property).
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These zoning reforms advanced local health policy goals beyond merely
the growth and distribution of healthy foods in neighborhoods. Street
vendors, farmers’ markets, and farm stands enhance public health by
promoting both healthy eating and physical activity.173 Moreover, by
allowing consumers to obtain fresh food at lower prices than traditional
grocery stores, they address food affordability, a problem normally
exacerbated by the food desert dilemma.174
III. IMPEDIMENTS TO LOCAL GOVERNMENT EFFORTS
While local government health policy innovation abounds, municipalities
face a number of hurdles in employing their land use and general regulatory
powers to affect such initiatives. Some of these impediments stem from
policy restrictions. For example, some cities face space challenges when
trying to site supermarkets in food deserts within their boundaries. Fullservice supermarkets can require up to 150,000 square feet plus additional
space for parking.175 Therefore, finding suitable locations for grocery stores
in urban areas is often difficult. In addition, many cities may also find that
their general plans and zoning codes are outdated and need significant
updating—not always a simple process—in order to advance some of the
aforementioned initiatives.176
Local governments may also face political resistance to these reforms.
Specifically, some residents may not believe that it is the appropriate role for
their city to restrict food options through measures such as soda bans and
zoning limitations for liquor stores and fast-food restaurants.177 Indeed,
opponents of this type of municipal action criticize the government for
overreaching and acting as a “nanny state.”178 Resident resistance may also
be exacerbated by the fact that obesity is a complex problem with various
contributing factors—thus no one law or ordinance will necessarily produce
the desired results.179
Yet the most significant impediments to local government efforts in health
policy are legal ones: in particular, cities’ limited powers as local
173. See Morales & Kettles, supra note 170, at 32 (noting that street vendors, farmers’
markets, and farm stands promote physical activity because patrons walk to these food
options).
174. See Loftus, supra note 129, at 1.
175. See id.
176. See Voigt, supra note 158, at 538.
177. See Graham M. Catlin, Comment, A More Palatable Solution? Comparing the
Viability of Smart Growth Statutes to Other Legislative Methods of Controlling the Obesity
Epidemic, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 1091, 1093 (2007).
178. See Price, supra note 72, at 358.
179. See generally Christian M. Gunneson, Note, Why Fast Food Bans are the Wrong
Solution to Address America’s Obesity Problem and What Should Be Done Instead, 15
QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 209, 210 (2012).
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governments coupled with the strength of state preemption. Municipalities
have long been recognized as “creatures of the state.”180 States thus create—
and abolish—local governments and provide them with various powers if
they so choose.181 States generally follow one of two approaches to local
government powers: Dillon’s Rule or home rule. States that follow Dillon’s
Rule—approximately ten states do so—provide municipalities with a finite
set of powers that are expressly delegated to them.182 State home rule
provisions delegate legislative authority for local matters to charter cities
except for those areas reserved by or for the state.183 Thus, cities in states
that follow Dillon’s Rule have more limited powers than those in home rule
states.184 Home rule states are usually categorized as either imperio home
rule or legislative home rule.185 In imperio home rule states, municipalities
have authority to regulate matters of local concern, but less power to regulate
in subjects of statewide interest.186 Legislative home rule provides cities
with all of the Tenth Amendment police powers delegated to their respective
states, but the states reserve the right to preempt such local authority.187
While legislative home rule cities have broader regulatory authority enabling
them to adopt health policy ordinances, such action may have tenuous legal
footing, because the state may preempt it.
Therefore, the greatest threat to local government experimentation and
innovation is state preemption. State preemption of local laws can be either
express or implied.188 Express preemption occurs when states explicitly
announce in their constitution or a statute that municipalities cannot legislate
or regulate in a particular field because it is reserved for state legislation.189
Implicit preemption occurs when state courts invalidate local laws, finding
that the state intended to occupy a particular field or policy area despite the
lack of explicit constitutional or statutory language suggesting such an

180. See City of Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182, 187 (1923); see also Hunter v.
Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178 (1907).
181. See Michael A. Lawrence, Do “Creatures of the State” Have Constitutional Rights?:
Standing for Municipalities to Assert Procedural Due Process Claims Against the State, 47
VILL. L. REV. 93, 96, 100 (2002).
182. See Courtney Walmer, Note, Governing Hydraulic Fracturing Through State-Local
Dynamic Federalism: Lessons from a Florida Case Study, 42 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 867, 879
(2015); see also Diller, supra note 103, at 90.
183. See Paul Diller, Intrastate Preemption, 87 B.U. L. REV. 1113, 1126 (2007).
184. See id. at 90.
185. See id.
186. See id.
187. See id.
188. See Patrick M. Steel, Note, Obesity Regulation Under Home Rule: An Argument that
Regulation by Local Governments is Superior to Administrative Agencies, 37 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1127, 1148 (2016).
189. See id.
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intention.190 Indeed, even in matters generally viewed as local affairs, state
courts tend to side with the state over local governments in a preemption
challenge.191
State preemption has become a tool used by business groups opposed to
these new health policies to block or overturn such laws.192 For example,
after San Francisco adopted its “happy meal” ordinance, businesses were
successful in lobbying the State of Arizona to pass a law prohibiting local
governments from regulating incentive items to their customers—expressly
preempting this area of law and policy.193 Similarly, the State of Tennessee
preempted municipal menu-disclosure laws after Davidson County passed
one.194 The State of Ohio also attempted to preempt municipal trans-fat bans
after Cleveland adopted one in 2011.195 The Ohio Restaurant Association
lobbied the Ohio legislature to pass a statute expressly preempting local
government regulation in this and other health policy areas, such as
advertising practices and incentive item giveaways.196 Cleveland challenged
the state preemption as unconstitutional under the Ohio Constitution—which
provides cities like Cleveland the ability to regulate in the interest of public
health consistent with their police powers—and ultimately prevailed.197
Nevertheless, the strength and specter of state preemption poses a significant
challenge to local government efforts to regulate in the field of health policy.
CONCLUSION
Local governments’ foray into health policy has demonstrated innovative
approaches to combating obesity and other health-related concerns that the
federal and state governments have not been successful in addressing.
Indeed, anecdotal evidence suggests that these municipal ordinances are
bringing about some of the desired results that cities hoped they would spur.
For example, after San Francisco adopted its “happy meal” ban,
McDonald’s, Jack in the Box, and other fast food restaurants began to
include healthier food options in kids’ meals.198 Equally important, this local
government health policy experimentation influenced policy on the state and
federal levels. For example, the local menu-labeling laws helped catalyze

190. See generally Diller, supra note 183, at 1126.
191. See generally, Lynn A. Baker & Daniel B. Rodriguez, Constitutional Home Rule and
Judicial Scrutiny, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 1337 (2009).
192. See Rutkow et al., supra note 69, at 364.
193. See Sarah B. Schindler, Of Backyard Chickens and Front Yard Gardens: The Conflict
Between Local Governments and Locavores, 87 TUL. L. REV. 231, 271-73 (2012).
194. See Banker, supra note 64, at 909.
195. See Rutkow et al., supra note 69, at 364-65.
196. See id. at 365.
197. See id. at 366.
198. See Etow, supra note 70, at 1536.
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similar laws statewide in California, Maine, Massachusetts, and Oregon.199
In addition, such local laws served as models for the menu-labeling
requirements in the federal Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.200
In these and other respects, local government laws aimed at health policy
have been both noteworthy and successful. However, the threat of state
preemption still looms large. In particular, as noted above, state preemption
targeted cities’ general regulatory powers—thus limiting cities’ health policy
efforts. The states’ preemption focus may be due to the prevailing view that
“land use is perhaps the quintessential local responsibility” and power.201
Yet even in the land use sphere, some state governments have still preempted
local governments with regard to certain locally undesirable land uses such
as juvenile facilities and prisons.202 These examples demonstrate that even
in the land use sphere—which is viewed as largely sacrosanct for local
governments203—cities’ health policy efforts may be thwarted. State
preemption efforts will likely determine whether this type of local
government innovation in health policy can flourish—allowing cities to
replace states as the laboratories of democracy that Justice Brandeis
envisioned.

199. See Banker, supra note 64, at 908-09.
200. See Rutkow et al., supra note 69, at 357.
201. See Garnett, supra note 102, at 1205.
202. See Ilene S. Lieberman & Harry Morrison, Jr., Warning: Municipal Home Rule is in
Danger of Being Expressly Preempted By . . . , 18 NOVA L. REV. 1437, 1445 n.60 (1994).
203. See Lyn Loyd Creswell, Airport Policy in the United States: The Need for
Accountability, Planning, and Leadership, 19 TRANSP. L.J. 1, 35 (1990) (land use “is an almost
sacrosanct local prerogative”).

